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Abstract. The quest for Africa’s natural resources can be traced when the Portuguese set foot 
on African soil some 600 years. This was followed by Western Europeans and now China.  
Africa is endowed with huge reserves of mineral and natural resources. These have been the 
constant attraction to foreign countries seeking to control these natural resources and 
trading. Globalization further made the new scramble for Africa eminent. New players 
including China are developing and employing new strategies on how to enter and control 
these new markets. Chinese enterprises employ the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) and the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) market entry strategies to penetrate the African Market. This has 
alarmed the West.  
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1. Introduction  
n the heels of World War II (WW2) and with the creation of the 
United Nations Organization (UNO), European powers began to 
create the necessity to terminate colonial rule over most of Asia and 
Africa. The United Nations Trusteeship Council (UNTC)—an arm of the 
UNO was established to accomplish this decolonization objective, and to 
prepare these trust territories (former colonies) for independence. This 
move towards decolonization coincided with the start of the Cold War—
the ideological conflict and rivalry between the West and the East, 
championed by the United States in the West and the Soviet Union in the 
East—that led to the renewed demand for natural resources and economic 
dominance. This renewed demand for natural resources and markets 
quickly diminished the goal of decolonization to a possibly questionable 
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failure, thus giving rise to neocolonialism—indirect economic and political 
control and influence over former colonies. Based on these competing 
interests and objectives of the superpowers and Europe, the exploitation of 
Africa has continued under the guise of business partnerships and other 
forms of partnership within a global economic and political system. 
Africa has experienced exploitation of its resources by outside powers to 
serve self-interest spanning lengthy periods in history (Anyu & Afam, 
2008). The forerunners of colonialism—Portuguese were first to set foot on 
the continent around the 15th Century for exploration of gold; thereby, 
supporting the fact that Africa for a period of almost 600 years has been the 
subject of contentious periods of exploitations. This alleged objective of 
seeking to trade or engage in business in Africa led to “relegation of Africa 
to a peripheral role in the global economy” (Anyu & Afam, 2008, p.92). 
African nations have not been able to negotiate deals that are mutually 
beneficial with European nations because they rely on these former colonial 
masters to continue to model agreements that have inevitably stunted 
development within the continent. Failure by the former colonial powers to 
deliver on their undertakings, has left Africa today with only one option —
China, who has visibly supported developmental projects in return for good 
business. In this article, we examine Chinese immersion into African 
Markets with keenness on the entry strategies, implications for capacity 
building, and sensitivities to issues surrounding social responsibility. China 
developed friendly relations with most African nations and encouraged the 
migration of some of its nationals to Africa. These Chinese operated 
businesses, mainly in the informal sector, began to compete with the less 
skilled local business operators. China’s need for natural resources and 
agricultural products matched Africa’s need for modernizing its 
infrastructure (roads, railways, transportations, public amenities, 
hydropower), and for developing its human capital. To succeed in this 
economic environment and for the local African communities to 
acknowledge their presence, the Chinese government has encouraged its 
citizens in Africa to pay attention to ethical standards and any ethical issues 
that may be encountered. CSR in today’s business atmosphere is 
unavoidable and has become an integral part of business activities; 
environmental soundness and social progress (Cheng & Liang, 2011) to 
achieve economic growth. 
 
2. Market entry strategies 
The Sino-African relations emerged as a spin-off from Chinese geo-
political policies in Asia. The historic silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and 
the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road now termed One Belt, One Road 
(OBOR) presented internationally as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
guided Chinese policies towards this geographic periphery. BRI was 
geared towards strengthening Beijing’s economic leadership through 
engagement in vast infrastructure building (Swaine, 2015). The belt refers to 
the overland interconnecting infrastructure corridors. The Sino-African 
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relations refers to historical, political, economic, military, social and 
cultural connections between China and the continent of Africa."The 65 or 
so countries that have so far signed on to the program (including 
approximately 20 from Africa) account for 30 percent of the world’s GDP 
and 75 percent of its energy reserves. Some 50 Chinese state-owned 
companies are implementing 1,700 infrastructure projects around the 
world worth about US $900 billion.” (Nantulya, 2019, p.1). 
Discussionsrelating to Africa’s market entry strategies often focus on the 
ambitious foreign and economic policies that are disguised as development 
strategies. OBOR has gained significance as Chinese foreign policy 
(Nantulya, 2019), but more importantly, it is the bedrock of the policy 
developed with African nations under their international aid architecture. 
China’ said policy followed two main market-oriented reforms; first, 
diversification of sources of funding through collaborative activities and  
joint ventures, and by issuing low-interest loans through the Export-Import 
(Exim) Bank of China. Human capital development, technical training, and 
capacity building are assisted by structures like the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), (Cheng, Fang, & Lien, 2012). The West continues to 
view this aggressive Chinese policy towards Africa with skepticism and in 
some cases has described it as exploitative and opportunistic (Anyu & 
Afam, 2008) in approach. Benjelloun (2015) adds that while Africans 
viewed the visible Chinese economic presence on their continent as 
laudable, the West has strong critical impressions of the agreements, and 
consider them unfair. 
China’s entry strategy into the African market is primarily focused on 
infrastructure building. .Described herein are examples of agreements that 
include railway construction or rehabilitation projects. In the case of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—which was ranked second on the 
list of African nations GDP growth thanks to Chinese foreign direct 
investment between 2003 and 2009 (Weisbrod & Whalley, 2011)—in 2007, it 
entered into an agreement with two Chinese construction firms China 
Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC), Sinohydro, and Metallurgial 
Group Corporation (MCC) to complete road pavement and railway 
construction or rehabilitation projects, health centers and hospitals, low-
cost housing, and universities. DRC offered copper-cobalt mining ventures 
to China’s Exim Bank as security for infrastructure loans. The two 
successive tranches of financing were US $3 billion each. The concession by 
DRC was for the Chinese to maintain 68 percent ownership. 
In 2007, Nigeria as well entered into an agreement with China Exim 
Bank for a US $2 billion line of credit, offer at what the African nation 
perceived to be very competitive commercial rate in order to finance 
infrastructural projects in connection with a preferential access to oil 
blocks. Separate from this agreement, the Chinese government offered a 
line of credit in the amount of US $500 million with a preferential line of 
export credit. Though not followed through, this line of credit at one time 
was slated for rebuilding of the Lagos-Kano railway.  
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China issued several oil-backed loans for infrastructure development 
projects in Angola in 2003 at London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus 
1.5 percent. Specifically, Sinohydro invested about US $900 million in 30 
projects in which over 8,200 local workers were employed (Cheng & Liang, 
2011). These rounds of loans issued were for rebuilding of war-ravaged 
infrastructure (agriculture, electricity, hospitals, irrigation systems, 
railways, schools, telecommunications, and water treatment systems 
(Bräutigam, 2010), and financed at non-concessional rates. On keener 
examination of the three agreements described here above, the contention 
about opportunism and exploitation becomes a theme worth exploring 
further. What is obvious in these agreements is that none of the offers made 
by China to these African nations seem to have amounted to foreign aid 
(Official Development Assistance), rather, they involved credit for future 
investments. 
In regard to the entry strategies by China into Africa, it is imperative to 
understand migration trends and patterns. Chinese migration to Africa can 
be categorized under the following three types: (1) temporary labor 
migration linked to public works and infrastructure projects executed by 
Chinese enterprises; (2) entrepreneurial migration flow made up of 
merchants native to mainland China some of whom come from the 
different diaspora communities; (3) proletarian transit migration flow 
consisting of people trying to sell their labor in western countries while 
waiting in Africa for opportunities to enter those countries (Mung, 2008). 
The total number of Chinese living in 38 select African nations were 129,605 
in 2001 and estimated to grow to about 820,050 between 2003 and 2008 
(Ohio University database, 2001, 2003–2008). With the exponential growth 
trends in the migration of Chinese to Africa, the number today surpasses 
one million; in contrast, there are an estimated 200,000 Africans working 
in China. According to the China-Africa Business Council several thousand 
Chinese farmers migrated to Kenya, Uganda, Ghana and Senegal most 
from Hubei Province (Monson, 2005), and others in Zimbabwe, Zambia 
and South Africa (Sautman, 2006). According to Zadek, et al., (2009): 
The Chinese are largely successful in international trade because as 
part of their entry strategy, they seek understanding and respond to 
“environmental, social and governance risk[s], maintaining their 
formal and informal ‘license to operate’ through productive relations 
with government bodies, neighboring communities, workers and 
suppliers, and helping to secure sustainable development in the 
region through both their products and services and their influence on 
the local business environment”(p.8). 
Chinese companies engaged in business in Africa increasingly are 
seeking local labor (Benjelloun, 2015). This reliance on local labor explains 
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3. Implications for capacity building 
Since its announcement, BRI has forged intertwining economic, political, 
and security ties between Africa and China, essentially advancing Beijing’s 
geopolitical interests. OBOR directly supports many elements of China’s 
national security strategy. At a macro level, OBOR sought to reshape the 
world economic order in ways only favorable to Beijing’s drive for greater 
power status.  
OBOR has two components: (1) The Silk Road Economic Belt establishes 
six land corridors connecting China’s interior to Central Asia and Europe; 
including railroads to Europe, oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea to 
China, and a high-speed train network connecting Southeast Asia to 
China’s eastern seaboard. (2) The Maritime Silk Road that establishes three 
Blue Economic Passages knitted together through a chain of seaports from 
the South China Sea to Africa,  also directing trade to and from China. 
According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), Africa has the 
highest unemployment rate in the world. In many cases, the high 
unemployment rate is a result of lack of training rather than lack of jobs 
(Weisbrod & Whalley, 2011). Development of human capital may be 
achieved through training partnerships and targeted jobs creation. 
Knowledge sharing or transfer from Chinese expertise to local African 
communities is critical to transform partnerships from dependency to 
collaborative (Dzekashu & McCollum, 2014). 
Another strategy to transfer knowledge has been through production 
platforms. In this light, the Huajian Group, a Chinese company, established 
a shoe manufacturing factory in Ethiopia where it hired 3,500 Ethiopians; 
thus, relocating jobs thousands of jobs to Africa (Hamlin, Gridneff, & 
Davidson, 2014).Considering the challenges associated with “encouraging 
…knowledge [sharing, which] is not a particularly easy task because of the 
prevalence of the knowledge is power paradigm.” (Dzekashu 2015, p.105), 
these Chinese companies have a herculean task of sharing business secrets 
as a way of building and maintaining bilateral cooperation.  
The rise of China possibly challenges the priorities and plans of the 
West, while undermining the sincerity of their advice (Humphrey & Dirk, 
2016). Impact of Chinese business influence in Africa is felt in power and 
governance structures of Bretton Woods institutions—aimed at rebuilding 
shattered postwar economy and promoting international economic 
cooperation. These institutions constitute the dominant philosophies and 
directions that currently shape developmental policies and strategies; and 
changing standards in ethical concerns such as the environment and 
human rights (Anyu & Afam, 2008). 
Much of the activities China has undertaken in Africa have been viewed 
with suspicion or seen as profit-centered rather than ideologically based. 
Labor support programs provided by China to Africa, were originally 
linked to temporary worker migration. Examples include; 15,000–20,000 
medical personnel sent to Africa to assist in development of hospitals and 
clinics; 10,000 agro technicians sent to work on about 200 agricultural 
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projects that included establishing farms,  and agricultural,  training 
stations (Park, 2009). 
Another initiative lunched by the Chinese in 2009 was the 20+20 
Cooperation Plan; in which 20 higher education institutions in China and 
Africa partnered with the goal of facilitating academic exchange. The 
United Nations Education and Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) joined this initiative that was aimed at facilitating university 
partnerships (Benjelloun, 2015). Additional initiative that demonstrates 
China’s goodwill to engage in capacity building is the creation of the China-
Africa Think Tank forum. These Chinese African think tanks organized 
under FOCAC such as the 10+10 Partnership Plan was implemented by 
selecting 10 think tanks each from China and Africa. 
 
4. Corporate social responsibility 
While many companies in the West have moved some of their 
production and marketing operations to the emerging economies where 
they have perceived businesses to be more profitable, and less risky, China 
on her part has been and continues to invest in Africa against a background 
of closer economic ties. For China to succeed in creating economic 
opportunities that are mutually beneficial, it is imperative for its 
multinational businesses to address environmental and social challenges, 
opportunities, and risks that arise. Chinese companies will need to act 
responsibly. Among other things, they must ensure that provisions to 
safeguard the environment and health of African workers are considered. 
Benjelloun (2015) affirms that while calls by the international community; 
predominantly by the West, for corporate social responsibility practices by 
Chinese companies started in 2007, their uncertain record has left the 
impression that Beijing’s influence over corporate practices is limited. 
African countries should therefore put in place the appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms to ensure environmental protections, and especially pursue 
green growth pathways (Benjelloun, 2015). 
With respect to market forces, Cheng & Liang (2011) suggest that the 
Chinese government has played a critical role in encouraging companies to 
invest in Africa. The process to facilitate these ventures of Chinese 
businesses in Africa has been through improvement of investment climate, 
development of China Africa  
Development Fund (CADF), and encouragement of carving out Special 
Economic Development Zones (SEDZ) in the host nations (Cheng & Liang, 
2011). However, the future success of these endeavors is going to be 
determined by adherence of the Chinese business community to its legal 
and moral responsibilities. 
Chinese government has taken the position of joining the civil society in 
putting pressure on their business partners to play critical roles and for 
these entities to incorporate CSR in their business strategy. These 
development and enforcement of governmental regulations seemingly 
became necessary because of the non-stop scandals of environmental 
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disaster and poisonous food around the country that rocked China (Cheng 
& Liang, 2011). In 2009, Shanghai Stock Exchange announced its CSR Index; 
subsequently entering a partnership with China Business News in 2011 to 
launch an Index for reporting Socially Responsible Investment (Cheng & 
Liang, 2011).  This move was significant in adopting CSR as part of the 
Chinese business model in Africa. 
In terms of academic initiatives, China–Africa co-operation should be 
reinforced in education, research, and business management to support 
human resource development needs in Africa and to help local economies 
develop. Joint research laboratories need to be established in African 
nations to develop fields necessary to face future challenges such as 
nanotechnology and materials science, biotechnology for health and 
agriculture, informatics, alternative sources of energy and the social 
sciences (Benjelloun, 2015). 
Examination of Chinese involvement in African markets discussed 
herein barely exemplifies the issues surrounding their ventures within the 
continent. To make the relationship between China and Africa durable and 
productive (profitable to both parties), China must commit to training the 
Africans where there is active Chinese investment and an utter lack of 
African expertise at the managerial as well as the skilled, and semi-skilled 
workers’ levels (Benjelloun, 2015) by transferring maintenance and support 
contracts to local communities. Failure to genuinely transfer intellectual 
capacity to the African markets would result in continuous dependence on 
Chinese support for rehabilitation of systems into the future, therefore, 
maintaining Africans as “willing partners in their own exploitation” (Anyu 
& Afam, 2008, p.3). 
CSR poses opportunities and challenges for development in Africa. 
There are lessons to be drawn from the ineffective development policies of 
the past decades by Europeans in Africa. Though for the most part China 
has fulfilled its social responsibility obligations in Africa, Chinese 
companies continue to face major challenges in delivering outcomes mainly 
in bridging the gap between knowledge of CSR and implementation 
mechanisms. The gap mostly is due to lack of experience engaging with the 
local communities—resulting from cultural, linguistic, and ideological 




With the West crying foul, about China’s intentions in Africa, there is an 
ongoing concern about how the suspicion may affect US-China relations. In 
effect, the U.S. sees itself as a viable alternative to China, as evidenced by 
the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Stata for African Affairs utterance that the 
African countries would benefit greatly from an increased investment by 
U.S. companies, and the creation of development projects that would create 
jobs and maintain higher environmental and business standards. In his 
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own words the Assistant Secretary said to the U.S. House Foreign Affairs 
Committee that: 
One of the things that really, really irritated me during my trips to 
Africa is you go to an African city and there is a stadium invariably 
built by the Chinese… We must remain a positive alternative and 
make clear that engaging with the United States will mean greater 
prosperity and security for Africa… Our potential in Africa is 
limitless… Africa is facing a demographic tsunami (The Associated 
Press, 2019, p.1). 
Competition for African resources between China and the West, chiefly, 
the United States could if not replaced with healthy cooperation, result in 
future conflicts (Anyu & Afam, 2008). The burning question Africa wants 
answered is: What tangible development have members of the European 
Union (EU) and the U.S. accomplished since the wave of independence in 
Africa in the 1960s? 
The EU and China can join hands to improve the capacity of Chinese 
investors in Africa on the question of CSR, especially in training senior 
management in implementation, evaluation, and collaborative partnership 
building for CSR. On its part, the U.S. enacted the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000 to encourage the exporting of African 
textiles and other products to the U.S. Unfortunately, only few African 
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